

**FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**

**SMALL AIRPLANES, ROTORCRAFT, GLIDERS,
BALLOONS, & AIRSHIPS**

BIWEEKLY 2015-22

10/19/2015 - 11/1/2015



Federal Aviation Administration
Continued Operational Safety Policy Section, AIR-141
P.O. Box 25082
Oklahoma City, OK 73125-0460

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SMALL AIRCRAFT, ROTORCRAFT, GLIDERS, BALLOONS, & AIRSHIPS

AD No.	Information	Manufacturer	Applicability
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Information Key: E - Emergency; COR - Correction; S – Supersedes; R - Replaces

Biweekly 2015-01

2014-26-04		GROB-WERKE	G115EG and G120A
2014-26-05		Beechcraft Corporation	G58

Biweekly 2015-02

2014-26-02		Airbus Helicopters	EC155B1 and AS 365 N3 helicopters
2015-01-02		Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.	MU-2B-30, MU-2B-35, MU-2B-36, MU-2B-36A and MU-2B-60

Biweekly 2015-03

2014-12-11 R1	R 2014-12-11	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation	S-92A
2015-01-03		Pilatus Aircraft Ltd	PC-7
2015-02-01	S 2011-23-01	Technify Motors GmbH (TMG)	TAE 125-01 and TAE 125-02-99
2015-02-07		Lycoming Engines	AEIO-320-D1B; AEIO-360-A1E, -A1E6, -B1H, -H1B; AEIO-540-D4A5, -D4B5, -D4D5, -L1B5, -L1B5D, -L1D5; AEIO-580-B1A; and IO-540-K1K5
2015-02-09		Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecnam srl	P2006T
2015-02-10		Viking Air Limited	DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-2 Mk. III
2015-02-15		Quest Aircraft Design, LLC	KODIAK 100
2015-02-22	S 2012-14-06	Rolls-Royce Corporation	250-B17, -B17B, -B17C, -B17D, -B17E, -B17F, -B17F/1, -B17F/2; and 250-C20, -C20B, -C20F, -C20J, -C20R, -C20R/1, -C20R/2, -C20R/4, -C20S, and -C20W
2015-02-27	S 2013-19-19	Airbus Helicopters	AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, AS332L2, and EC225LP

Biweekly 2015-04

2014-22-51		Airbus Helicopters	EC130T2 helicopters
2015-02-21		Agusta S.p.A.	AB139 and AW139 helicopters
2015-04-51	E	Enstrom Helicopter Corporation	F-28A, 280, F-28C, F-28C-2, F-28C-2R, 280C, F-28F, F-28F-R, 280F, 280FX, and 480 helicopters

Biweekly 2015-05

2015-04-01		Short Brothers & Harland Ltd	SC-7 Series 3
2015-04-04		Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.	412 and 412EP
2015-04-05		Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation	S-76A, S-76B, S-76C, and S-76D
2015-05-51	E	Agusta S.p.A.	A109A and A109A II
2015-05-52	E	Agusta S.p.A.	A109, A109A, A109A II, A109C, A109K2, A109E, A119, A109S, AW119 MKII, and AW109SP

Biweekly 2015-06

2015-04-01	COR	Short Brothers & Harland Ltd	SC-7 Series 3 airplanes
2015-05-04		Bell Helicopter Textron Canada	407 helicopters
2015-05-05	S 2014-04-14	Agusta	A109S and AW109SP helicopters; A119 and AW119 MKII helicopters
2015-05-06		Flugzeugwerke Altenrhein AG	AS 202/15 "BRAVO", AS 202/18A "BRAVO", and AS 202/18A4 "BRAVO" airplanes
2015-06-01	S 2014-06-03	British Aerospace	Jetstream Series 3101 and Jetstream 3201 airplanes
2015-06-02		GA 8 Airvan	GA8-TC320 airplanes
2015-06-03		Stemme AG	S6 and S6-RT gliders

Biweekly 2015-07

2015-06-09		Pacific Aerospace Limited	750XL airplanes
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Biweekly 2015-08

2015-05-52		Agusta S.p.A.	A109, A109A, A109A II, A109C, A109K2, A109E, A119, A109S, AW119 MKII, and AW109SP
2015-07-03		Cessna Aircraft Company	402C and 414A
2015-07-04		Pilatus Aircraft Ltd.	PC-7
2015-08-51	E S 2015-04-51	The Enstrom Helicopter Corporation	F-28A, 280, F-28C, F-28C-2, F-28C-2R, 280C, F-28F, F-28F-R, 280F, and 280FX; and 480

SMALL AIRCRAFT, ROTORCRAFT, GLIDERS, BALLOONS, & AIRSHIPS

AD No.	Information	Manufacturer	Applicability
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Biweekly 2015-09

2014-17-08R1	R 2014-17-08	Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (P&WC)	PT6A-114 and PT6A-114A
2015-08-04	S 99-01-05 R1	Various Airplanes	See AD

Biweekly 2015-10

2015-08-07		Zodiac Aerotechnics	See Ad
2015-09-01		Airbus Helicopters	EC225LP
2015-09-04	S 2013-22-14 R1	DG Flugzeugbau GmbH	DG-1000T
2015-09-06	S 2014-26-04	GROB-WERKE	G115EG and G120A

Biweekly 2015-11

2015-08-51	S 2015-04-51	The Enstrom Helicopter Corporation	F-28A, 280, F-28C, F-28C-2, F-28C-2R, 280C, F-28F, F-28F-R, 280F, 280FX; 480
2015-10-05		Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter France)	AS365N3, EC155B, and EC155B1
2015-10-06		Lycoming Engines	TIO-540-AJ1A
2015-10-07	S 2014-01-01	Turbomeca S.A.	Arrius 2F
2015-10-51	E	Avidyne Aerospace	Integrated Flight Displays
2015-11-01		Slingsby Aviation Ltd.	T67M260 and T67M260-T3A

Biweekly 2015-12

2015-11-06	S 2013-18-01	Airbus Helicopters	EC 155B, EC155B1, SA-365N, SA-365N1, AS-365N2, AS 365 N3, and SA-366G1
2015-11-07		Agusta S.p.A.	AB412 and AB412 EP
2015-11-08	S 2014-02-08	Agusta	A109C, A109S, A109K2, A109E, and AW109SP
2015-11-09		Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation	269D and 269D
2015-11-10		Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation	S-92A
2015-12-01		Airbus Helicopters	AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, and AS355F2
2015-12-02		Bell	206L-1, 206L-3, and 206L-4

Biweekly 2015-13

2015-05-51		Agusta S.p.A.	A109A, A109A II
2015-10-51		Avidyne Corporation	Integrated Flight Displays (IFDs)
2015-12-04	COR R 2006-15-08	Honeywell International Inc.	TPE331-1, -2, -2UA, -3U, -3UW, -5, -5A, -5AB, -5B, -6, -6A, -10, -10AV, -10GP, -10GT, -10P, -10R, -10T, -10U, -10UA, -10UF, -10UG, -10UGR, -10UR, -11U, -12JR, -12UA, -12UAR, and -12UHR
2015-12-09		Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH	EC135P1, EC135T1, EC135P2, EC135T2, EC135P2+, EC135T2+, and MBB-BK 117 C-2

Biweekly 2015-14

2015-13-03		Przedsiębiorstwo Doswiadczalno-Produkcyjne Szybownictwa "PZL-Bielsko"	SZD-50-3 "Puchacz"
2015-13-09		Piper Aircraft, Inc.	PA-46-350P and PA-46-500TP
2015-13-10	S 2011-17-07	M7 Aerospace LLC	SA226-T, SA226-T(B), SA226-TC, and SA226-AT
2015-13-11		Bell Helicopter Textron Canada	430

Biweekly 2015-15

2015-06-02 R1	R 2015-06-02	GA 8 Airvan (Pty) Ltd	TC320
2015-12-04	COR R2006-15-08	Honeywell International Inc.	TPE331-1, -2, -2UA, -3U, -3UW, -5, -5A, -5AB, -5B, -6, -6A, -10, -10AV, -10GP, -10GT, -10P, -10R, -10T, -10U, -10UA, -10UF, -10UG, -10UGR, -10UR, -11U, -12JR, -12UA, -12UAR, and -12UHR
2015-14-02		GE Aviation Czech s.r.o.	M601E-11, M601E-11A, and M601F
2015-14-04		Kaman Aerospace Corporation	K-1200
2015-14-10		Pilatus Aircraft LTD	PC-12/47 and PC-12/47E
2015-15-04		Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.	204B, 205A, and 205A-1; and 212

Biweekly 2015-16

2015-12-04	COR R 2006-15-08	Honeywell International Inc.	TPE331-1, -2, -2UA, -3U, -3UW, -5, -5A, -5AB, -5B, -6, -6A, -10, -10AV, -10GP, -10GT, -10P, -10R, -10T, -10U, -10UA, -10UF, -10UG, -10UGR, -10UR, -11U, -12JR, -12UA, -12UAR, and -12UHR
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SMALL AIRCRAFT, ROTORCRAFT, GLIDERS, BALLOONS, & AIRSHIPS

AD No.	Information	Manufacturer	Applicability
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2015-13-04	S 2014-19-05	Turbomeca S.A.	Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, 1S1, 2B, 2B1, 2C, 2C1, 2C2, 2S1, and 2S2
2015-16-51	E	Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (Bell)	429
Biweekly 2015-17			
2015-16-04		Kidde Gravier	See AD
2015-16-05		British Aerospace Regional Aircraft	Jetstream Series 3101 and Jetsream Model 3201
2015-16-06		British Aerospace Regional Aircraft	Jetstream Model 3201
2015-16-07		Reims Aviation S.A.	F406
2015-17-01	S 2013-21-01	Airbus Helicopters	AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350C, AS350D, AS350D1, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP
2015-17-02	S 2001-13-51	Bell Helicopter Textron Canada	206L-4, 407, 427, and 429
Biweekly 2015-18			
2015-17-10	S 2007-04-13	SOCATA	TBM 700
2015-17-11		Airbus Helicopters	AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350C, AS350D, AS350D1, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, AS355NP, EC130B4, and EC130T2
2015-17-18		Turbomeca S.A.	Arrius 2F
2015-17-20		GE Aviation Czech s.r.o	M601E-11, M601E-11A, and M601F
2015-18-01		Vulcanair S.p.A.	P.68R
Biweekly 2015-19			
2015-18-51	E	Airbus Helicopters	AS332C, AS332C1, AS332L, and AS332L1
2015-19-51	E	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation	S-76A, S-76B, S-76C, and S-76D
Biweekly 2015-20			
2015-19-07	S 2011-26-04	Lycoming Engines	See AD
2015-19-10	S 97-02-02	M7 Aerospace	SA26-AT, SA26-T, SA226-AT, SA226-T, SA226-T(B), SA226-TC, SA227-AC (C-26A), SA227-AT, SA227-BC (C-26A), SA227-CC, SA227-DC (C-26B), SA227-TT
2015-19-11		PIAGGIO AERO INDUSTRIES S.p.A	P-180
2015-19-14		Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD)	BO-105A, BO-105C, and BO-105S
2015-19-15		Pilatus Aircraft Ltd	PC-12, PC-12/45, and PC-12/47E
2015-20-51	E	See AD	UH-12-series
Biweekly 2015-21			
2015-18-03		Honeywell International Inc.	TPE331-5, -5A, -5AB, -5B, -10, -10R, -10U, -10UF, -10UG, -10UGR, and -10UR
2015-18-51		Airbus Helicopters	AS332C, AS332C1, AS332L, and AS332L1
2015-20-04		Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp	PT6B-37A
2015-20-09	R 2001-18-06 R 2008-22-16	General Electric Company	CT58-100-2, CT58-110-1, CT58-110-2, CT58-140-1, and CT58-140-2
2015-20-11		Schempp-Hirth Flugzeugbau GmbH	Duo Discus and Duo Discus T
2015-20-13		Piper Aircraft, Inc.	PA-28-161, PA-28-181; and PA-28R-201
Biweekly 2015-22			
2015-06-02 R2	R 2015-06-02 R1	GA 8 Airvan (Pty) Ltd	GA8-TC320
2015-18-03	COR	Honeywell International Inc.	TPE331-5, -5A, -5AB, -5B, -10, -10R, -10U, -10UF, -10UG, -10UGR, and -10UR
2015-19-51		Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation	S-76A, S-76B, S-76C, and S-76D
2015-20-12		Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation; Sikorsky Aircraft; Croman Corporation; Carson Helicopters, Inc.; Glacier Helicopters, Inc.; Robinson Air Crane, Inc.; and Siller	S-61A, D, E, L, N, NM; and R, V, CH-3C, CH-3E, HH-3C, HH-3E, SH-3A, and SH-3H

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AD No.	Information	Manufacturer	Applicability
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2015-21-01		Helicopters	
2015-21-04		Technify Motors GmbH Pratt & Whitney	TAE 125-02-99 and TAE 125-02-114 PW4164, PW4168, PW4168A, PW4164-1D, PW4168-1D, PW4168A-1D, and PW4170
2015-22-02	S 2015-16-51	Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited	429
2015-22-04		Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG	G103 TWIN ASTIR, G103 TWIN II, and G103A TWIN II ACRO
2015-22-51	E	Agusta S.p.A.	A109A and A109A II
2015-22-52	E	Airbus Helicopters	AS350B3
2015-22-53	E	Airbus Helicopters	AS350B3
	S 2015-22-52		



2015-06-02 R2 GA 8 Airvan (Pty) Ltd: Amendment 39-18308; Docket No. FAA-2014-1123; Directorate Identifier 2014-CE-037-AD.

(a) Effective Date

This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective December 3, 2015.

(b) Affected ADs

This AD replaces AD 2015-06-02 R1, Amendment 39-18209 (80 FR 42010, July 16, 2015) ("AD 2015-06-02 R1").

(c) Applicability

This AD applies to GA 8 Airvan (Pty) Ltd GA8-TC320 airplanes, all serial numbers up to and including GA8-TC 320-14-205, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 71: Power Plant.

(e) Reason

AD 2015-06-02, Amendment 39-18120 (80 FR 14810, March 20, 2015) ("AD 2015-06-02") was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as missing required engine mount fire seal washers, which could reduce the engine retention capability in the event of a fire. We issued AD 2015-06-02 R1, Amendment 39-18209 to retain the actions of AD 2015-06-02 and to revise the applicable airplane serial numbers. We are issuing this AD to correct the AD number in the parenthetical of the compliance time in paragraph (f)(1) of the AD and to detect and correct the omission of steel washers at each isolator mount location, which, if not corrected, could result in reduced engine retention capability in the event of a fire.

(f) Actions and Compliance

Unless already done, comply with this AD within the compliance times specified in paragraphs (f)(1) through (f)(3) of this AD:

(1) Within the next 300 hours time-in-service after April 24, 2015 (the effective date retained from AD 2015-06-02 and AD 2015-06-02 R1) or within the next 12 months after April 24, 2015 (the effective date retained from AD 2015-06-02 and AD 2015-06-02 R1), whichever occurs first, inspect the orientation of the engine isolator mounts to verify that the mounts have been installed properly following the Accomplishment Instructions in GippsAero Mandatory Service Bulletin SB-GA8-2014-115, Issue 1, dated October 6, 2014.

(2) Before reinstalling the engine isolator mounts following the inspection required in paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, before further flight, install a part number J-2218-61 steel washer on the forward side of each of the four engine isolator mounts, following the Accomplishment Instructions in GippsAero Mandatory Service Bulletin SB-GA8-2014-115, Issue 1, dated October 6, 2014.

(3) If during the inspection required in paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, any of the engine isolator mounts are found to not comply with the specifications found in the Accomplishment Instructions of GippsAero Mandatory Service Bulletin SB-GA8-2014-115, Issue 1, dated October 6, 2014, before further flight, re-install the isolators to the correct orientation, or if damage is found, replace with airworthy parts.

(g) Other FAA AD Provisions

The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, Standards Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Doug Rudolph, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329-4059; fax: (816) 329-4090; email: doug.rudolph@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(h) Related Information

Refer to MCAI Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) AD No. AD/GA8/8, Amdt 1, dated March 26, 2015. The MCAI can be found in the AD docket on the Internet at: <http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-1123-0007>.

(i) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(3) The following service information was approved for IBR on April 24, 2015 (80 FR 14810, March 20, 2015).

(i) GippsAero Mandatory Service Bulletin SB-GA8-2014-115, Issue 1, dated October 6, 2014.

(ii) Reserved.

(4) For GippsAero service information identified in this AD, contact GA 8 Airvan (Pty) Ltd, c/o GippsAero Pty Ltd, Attn: Technical Services, P.O. Box 881, Morwell Victoria 3840, Australia; telephone: + 61 03 5172 1200; fax: +61 03 5172 1201; email: techpubs@gippsaero.com; Internet: <http://www.gippsaero.com/customer-support/technical-publications.aspx>.

(5) You may view this service information at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (816) 329-4148. In addition, you can access this service information on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-1123.

(6) You may view this service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html>.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on October 22, 2015.
Melvin Johnson,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.



2015-18-03 Honeywell International Inc. (Type Certificate previously held by AlliedSignal Inc., Garrett Engine Division; Garrett Turbine Engine Company; and AiResearch Manufacturing Company of Arizona): Docket No. FAA-2012-0913; Directorate Identifier 2012-NE-23-AD.

(a) Effective Date

This AD is effective November 13, 2015.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

(c) Applicability

This AD applies to Honeywell International Inc. TPE331-5, -5A, -5AB, -5B, -10, -10R, -10U, -10UF, -10UG, -10UGR, and -10UR model turboprop engines, with an engine propeller shaft coupling, part number (P/N) 3107065-1, 865888-3, 865888-6, or 865888-8, installed.

(d) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by engine propeller shaft coupling failures, leading to unexpected propeller pitch changes causing increased aerodynamic and asymmetric drag on the airplanes using these engines. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of airplane control, leading to an accident.

(e) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

(1) Engines Installed in Mitsubishi MU-2B Series (MU-2 Series) Airplanes:

(i) Remove from service the affected engine propeller shaft coupling at the earliest of the following:

(A) Next piece-part exposure; or

(B) Next turbine (hot) section inspection (HSI); or

(C) Before accumulating an additional 1,200 cycles after the effective date of this AD.

(2) Engines Installed in Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA) C-212 Series, and Twin Commander 690 and 695 Series (Jetprop Commander) Airplanes:

(i) Remove from service the affected engine propeller shaft coupling at the earliest of the following:

(A) Next piece-part exposure; or

(B) Next turbine HSI; or


(C) Before accumulating an additional 2,400 cycles after the effective date of this AD.

(3) Engines Installed in British Aerospace Jetstream 3101 Series, Dornier Luftfahrt Dornier 228 Series, and M7 (formerly Fairchild, Swearingen) SA226 and SA227 Series Airplanes, and all other airplanes not listed in this AD using affected engines:

(i) Remove from service the affected engine propeller shaft coupling at the earliest of the following:

- (A) Next piece-part exposure; or
- (B) Next turbine HSI; or
- (C) Before accumulating an additional 3,600 cycles after the effective date of this AD.
- (4) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, for all airplanes that use the affected engines, insert a copy of Figure 1 to paragraph (e) of this AD, into the Emergency Procedures Section of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), Pilot Operating Handbook (POH), and the Manufacturer's Operating Manual (MOM).

Figure 1 to Paragraph (e)–Airplane Operating Procedures



(f) Definition

For the purpose of this AD, next piece-part exposure is when the nose cone assembly is removed from the engine.

(g) Installation Prohibition

After the effective date of this AD, do not install any engine propeller shaft coupling, P/N 3107065-1, 865888-3, 865888-6, or 865888-8, into any engine.

(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Use the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19 to make your request.

(i) Related Information

(1) For more information about this AD, contact Joseph Costa, Aerospace Engineer, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 3960 Paramount Blvd., Lakewood, CA 90712-4137; phone: 562-627-5246; fax: 562-627-5210; email: joseph.costa@faa.gov.

(2) Allied-Signal Aerospace Company Service Bulletin No. TPE331-72-0873, Revision 1, dated May 20, 1993 and Honeywell International Inc. Operating Information Letter OI331-26, dated March 2, 2010, which are not incorporated by reference in this AD, can be obtained from Honeywell International, using the contact information in paragraph (i)(3) of this AD.

(3) For service information identified in this AD, contact Honeywell International Inc., 111 S. 34th Street, Phoenix, AZ 85034-2802; phone: 800-601-3099; Internet: <http://portal.honeywell.com>.

(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 781-238-7125.

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference

None.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on: October 2, 2015.
Colleen M. D'Alessandro,
Directorate Manager, Engine & Propeller Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.



2015-19-51 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation: Amendment 39-18300; Docket No. FAA-2015-3940; Directorate Identifier 2015-SW-065-AD.

(a) Applicability

This AD applies to Model S-76A, S-76B, S-76C, and S-76D helicopters with main rotor (M/R) servo input control pushrod (pushrod) assembly part number (P/N) 76400-00034-059 or tail rotor (T/R) pushrod assembly P/N 76400-00014-071 installed, certificated in any category.

(b) Unsafe Condition

This AD defines the unsafe condition as a loose jamnut. This condition could result in failure of a pushrod assembly, loss of M/R or T/R flight control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

(c) Effective Date

This AD becomes effective November 10, 2015 to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Emergency AD 2015-19-51, issued on September 14, 2015, which contains the requirements of this AD.

(d) Compliance

You are responsible for performing each action required by this AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

(e) Required Actions

Within five hours time-in-service:

(1) Inspect each pushrod end to determine whether a 0.020 inch diameter lockwire can pass through the inspection hole.

(i) If the lockwire passes through the inspection hole, replace the pushrod assembly.

(ii) If the lockwire does not pass through the inspection hole, inspect the jamnut to determine whether it is seated against the pushrod and whether it can be turned with finger pressure. If the jamnut is not seated against the pushrod or can be turned with finger pressure, replace the pushrod assembly.

(2) Apply two slippage marks across each pushrod tube and jamnut as follows:

(i) Clean the area where a slippage mark is to be applied.

(ii) Apply two slippage marks across the pushrod tube and jamnut, parallel and on opposite sides of each other. Each slippage mark must extend at least 0.5 inch onto the pushrod tube and must not cover the inspection hole. Figures 2 and 4 of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 76-67-57, Basic Issue, dated September 10, 2015, illustrate slippage marks across a pushrod tube and jamnut.

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: Blaine Williams, Aerospace Engineer, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781) 238-7161; email blaine.williams@faa.gov.

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office, before operating any aircraft complying with this AD through an AMOC.

(g) Additional Information

Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 76-67-57, Basic Issue, dated September 10, 2015, which is not incorporated by reference, contains additional information about the subject of this AD. For service information identified in this AD, contact Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Customer Service Engineering, 124 Quarry Road, Trumbull, CT 06611; telephone 1-800-Winged-S or 203-416-4299; email sikorskywcs@sikorsky.com. You may review a copy of the service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177.

(h) Subject

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 2700, Flight Control System.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 9, 2015.

Lance T. Gant,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.



2015-20-12 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation; Sikorsky Aircraft; Croman Corporation; Carson Helicopters, Inc.; Glacier Helicopters, Inc.; Robinson Air Crane, Inc.; and Siller Helicopters: Amendment 39-18291; Docket No. FAA-2008-0442; Directorate Identifier 2007-SW-24-AD.

(a) Applicability

This AD applies to Model S-61A, D, E, L, N, NM (serial number (S/N) 61454), R, V, CH-3C, CH-3E, HH-3C, HH-3E, SH-3A, and SH-3H helicopters with main rotor shaft (MRS), part number S6135-20640-001, S6135-20640-002, or S6137-23040-001, installed, certificated in any category.

(b) Unsafe Condition

This AD defines the unsafe condition as MRS structural failure, loss of power to the main rotor, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

(c) Affected ADs

This AD supersedes AD 98-26-02, Amendment 39-10943 (63 FR 69177, December 16, 1998).

(d) Effective Date

This AD becomes effective November 24, 2015.

(e) Compliance

You are responsible for performing each action required by this AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

(f) Required Actions

(1) Within 10 hours time-in-service (TIS):

(i) Create a component history card or equivalent record for each MRS.

(ii) If there is no record of the hours TIS on an individual MRS, substitute the helicopter's hours TIS or the helicopter's transmission hours TIS if both the shaft and transmission were installed new at the same time.

(iii) If the record of external lift cycles (lift cycles) on an individual MRS is incomplete, add the known number of lift cycles to a number calculated by multiplying the number of hours TIS of the individual MRS by the average lift cycles calculated according to the instructions in Section I of Appendix 1 of this AD or by a factor of 13.6, whichever is higher. An external lift cycle is defined as a flight cycle in which an external load is picked up, the helicopter is repositioned (through flight or hover), and the helicopter hovers and releases the load and departs or lands and departs.

(iv) At the end of each day's operations, record the number of lift cycles performed and the hours TIS.

(2) Within 250 hours TIS, determine whether the MRS is a repetitive external lift (REL) or Non-REL MRS.

(i) Calculate the first moving average of lift cycles by following the instructions in Section I of Appendix 1 of this AD.

(A) If the calculation results in 6 or more lift cycles per hour TIS, the MRS is an REL-MRS.

(B) If the calculation results in less than 6 lift cycles per hour TIS, the MRS is a Non-REL MRS.

(ii) If the MRS is a Non-REL MRS based on the calculation performed in accordance with paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this AD, thereafter at intervals of 50 hour TIS, recalculate the average lift cycles per hour TIS by following the instructions in Section II of Appendix 1 of this AD.

(iii) Once an MRS is determined to be an REL MRS, you no longer need to perform the 250-hour TIS moving average calculation, but you must continue to count and record the lift cycles and number of hours TIS.

(iv) If an MRS is determined to be an REL MRS, it remains an REL MRS for the rest of its service life and is subject to the retirement times for an REL MRS.

(3) Within 1,100 hours TIS:

(i) Conduct a Non-Destructive Inspection for a crack on each MRS. If there is a crack in an MRS, before further flight, replace it with an airworthy MRS.

(ii) If an MRS is determined to be an REL MRS, identify it as an REL MRS by etching "REL" on the outside diameter of the MRS near the part S/N by following the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 3.C., of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 61B35-69, dated April 19, 2004.

(4) Replace each MRS with an airworthy MRS on or before reaching the revised retirement life as follows:

(i) For an REL MRS that is not modified by following Sikorsky Customer Service Notice (CSN) No. 6135-10, dated March 18, 1987, and Sikorsky Service Bulletin (SB) No. 61B35-53, dated December 2, 1981 (unmodified REL MRS), the retirement life is 30,000 lift cycles or 1,500 hours TIS, whichever occurs first.

(ii) For an REL MRS that is modified by following Sikorsky CSN No. 6135-10, dated March 18, 1987, and Sikorsky SB No. 61B35-53 dated December 2, 1981; or Sikorsky CSN No. 6135-10A and Sikorsky SB No. 61B35-53A, both Revision A, and both dated April 19, 2004 (modified REL MRS), the retirement life is 30,000 lift cycles or 5,000 hours TIS, whichever occurs first.

(iii) For a Non-REL MRS, the retirement life is 13,000 hours TIS.

(5) Establish or revise the retirement lives of the MRS as indicated in paragraphs (f)(4)(i) through (f)(4)(iii) of this AD by recording the new or revised retirement life on the MRS component history card or equivalent record.

(6) Within 50 hours TIS, remove from service any MRS with oversized (0.8860" or greater diameter) dowel pin bores.

(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: Tracy Murphy, Aviation Safety Engineer, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine & Propeller Directorate, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781) 238-7172; email tracy.murphy@faa.gov.

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office, before operating any aircraft complying with this AD through an AMOC.

(h) Additional Information

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation All Operators Letter CCS-61-AOL-04-0005, dated May 18, 2004; Sikorsky Customer Service Notice (CSN) No. 6135-10, dated March 18, 1987; Sikorsky CSN No. 6135-10A, Revision A, dated April 19, 2004; Sikorsky Service Bulletin (SB) No. 61B35-53, dated December 2, 1981; and Sikorsky SB No. 61B35-53A, Revision A, dated April 19, 2004, which are

not incorporated by reference, contain additional information about the subject of this AD. For more information about these documents, contact Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, Connecticut, telephone (203) 383-4866, email tsslibrary@sikorsky.com, or at <http://www.sikorsky.com>. You may review a copy of the referenced service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177.

(i) Subject

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 6320, Main Rotor Gearbox.

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(i) Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 61B35-69, dated April 19, 2004.

(ii) Reserved.

(3) For Sikorsky service information identified in this AD, contact Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, Connecticut, telephone (203) 383-4866, email tsslibrary@sikorsky.com, or at <http://www.sikorsky.com>.

(4) You may view this service information at FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110.

(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to: <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html>.

Appendix 1 to AD 2015-20-12

Section I: The First Moving Average of External Lift Cycles (Lift Cycles) per Hour Time-in-Service (TIS)

The first moving average calculation is performed on the main rotor shaft (MRS) assembly when the external lift component history card record reflects that the MRS assembly has reached its first 250 hours TIS. To perform the calculation, divide the total number of lift cycles performed during the first 250 hours TIS by 250. The result will be the first moving average calculation of lift cycles per hour TIS.

Section II: Subsequent Moving Average of Lift Cycles per Hour TIS

Subsequent moving average calculations are performed on the MRS assembly at intervals of 50 hour TIS after the first moving average calculation. Subtract the total number of lift cycles performed during the first 50-hour TIS interval used in the previous moving average calculation from the total number of lift cycles performed on the MRS assembly during the previous 300 hours TIS. Divide this result by 250. The result will be the next or subsequent moving average calculation of lift cycles per hour TIS.

Section III: Sample Calculation for Subsequent 50 Hour TIS Intervals

Assume the total number of lift cycles for the first 50 hour TIS interval used in the previous moving average calculation = 450 lift cycles and the total number of lift cycles for the previous 300 hours TIS = 2700 lift cycles. The subsequent moving average of lift cycles per hour TIS = $(2700 - 450) \div 250 = 9$ lift cycles per hour TIS.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 4, 2015.

Lance T. Gant,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.



2015-21-01 Technify Motors GmbH (Type Certificate Previously Held by Thielert Aircraft Engines GmbH): Amendment 39-18293; Docket No. FAA-2015-1383; Directorate Identifier 2015-NE-15-AD.

(a) Effective Date

This AD becomes effective November 27, 2015.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

(c) Applicability

This AD applies to Technify Motors GmbH TAE 125-02-99 (commercial designation CD-135, formerly Centurion 2.0) and TAE 125-02-114 (commercial designation CD-155, formerly Centurion 2.0S) reciprocating engines, with a dual mass flywheel installed.

(d) Reason

This AD was prompted by reports of a gearbox drive shaft breaking during starting or restarting of the engine. We are issuing this AD to prevent overload and failure of the gearbox drive shaft, which could lead to failure of the engine, in-flight shutdown, and loss of control of the airplane.

(e) Actions and Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

Within 110 flight hours or at the next scheduled inspection after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, install a start phase monitoring system and software mapping. Use Technify Motors Service Bulletin (SB) No. SB TMG 125-1018 P1, Revision 1, dated February 5, 2015, to do the installation.

(f) Installation Prohibition

After the effective date of this AD, do not install onto any airplane any Technify Motors TAE 125-02-99 or TAE 125-02-114 reciprocating engine that is not equipped with a start phase monitoring system and software mapping.

(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

The Manager, Engine Certification Office, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Use the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19 to make your request. You may email your request to: ANE-AD-AMOC@faa.gov.

(h) Related Information

(1) For more information about this AD, contact Robert Green, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; phone: 781-238-7754; fax: 781-238-7199; email: robert.green@faa.gov.

(2) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency AD 2015-0055, dated March 31, 2015, for more information. You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2015-1383-0002>.

(3) Technify Motors SB No. TM TAE 000-0007, Revision 28, dated February 5, 2015; Technify Motors Installation Manual No. IM-02-02, Issue 4, Revision 2, dated January 30, 2015, with Chapter 02-IM-13-02, section 13.8.16, Revision 1, dated November 28, 2014; Technify Motors SB No. SB TMG 601-1007 P1, Revision 3, dated February 5, 2015; and Technify Motors SB No. SB TMG 651-1004 P1, Revision 2, dated February 5, 2015, which are not incorporated by reference in this AD, can be obtained from Technify Motors GmbH, using the contact information in paragraph (i)(3) of this AD.

(4) Diamond Aircraft Industries GmbH (DAI) MSB No. 42-109/1, dated February 4, 2015; and DAI MSB No. 42-007/16, dated February 4, 2015, which are not incorporated by reference in this AD, can be obtained from Diamond Aircraft Industries GmbH, using the contact information in paragraph (h)(5) of this AD.

(5) For DAI service information identified in this AD, contact Diamond Aircraft Industries GmbH, N. A. Otto-Strasse 5, 2700 Wiener Neustadt, Austria; phone: +43 2622 26700; fax: +43 2622 26700 1369; email: airworthiness@diamond-air.at.

(6) You may view this service information at the FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 781-238-7125.

(i) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(i) Technify Motors Service Bulletin (SB) No. SB TMG 125-1018 P1, Revision 1, dated February 5, 2015.

(ii) Reserved.

(3) For Technify Motors GmbH service information identified in this AD, contact Technify Motors GmbH, Platanenstrasse 14, D-09356 Sankt Egidien, Germany; phone: +49-37204-696-0; fax: +49-37204-696-55; email: info@centurion-engines.com.

(4) You may view this service information at FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 781-238-7125.

(5) You may view this service information at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html>.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on October 6, 2015.
Ann C. Mollica,
Acting Directorate Manager, Engine & Propeller Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.



2015-21-04 Pratt & Whitney: Amendment 39-18296; Docket No. FAA-2015-0869; Directorate Identifier 2015-NE-11-AD.

(a) Effective Date

This AD is effective November 27, 2015.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

(c) Applicability

This AD applies to all Pratt & Whitney (PW) PW4164, PW4168, PW4168A, PW4164-1D, PW4168-1D, PW4168A-1D, and PW4170 turbofan engines with 6th stage low-pressure turbine (LPT) disks, part number 50N886, installed.

(d) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by crack finds in the 6th stage LPT disk. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the 6th stage LPT disk, which could lead to an uncontained disk release, damage to the engine, and damage to the airplane.

(e) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. At the next LPT shop visit after the effective date of this AD, remove from service 6th stage LPT disks with serial numbers listed in the Accomplishment Instructions, Table 1, of PW Service Bulletin No. PW4G-100-72-252, dated November 18, 2014.

(f) Definition

For the purpose of this AD, an "LPT shop visit" is defined as the removal of the 6th stage disk from the LPT rotor and the removal of the blades from the disk.

(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

The Manager, Engine Certification Office, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Use the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19 to make your request. You may email your request to: ANE-AD-AMOC@faa.gov.

(h) Related Information

For more information about this AD, contact Besian Luga, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; phone: 781-238-7750; fax: 781-238-7199; email: besian.luga@faa.gov.

(i) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(3) The following service information was approved for IBR on November 27, 2015.

(i) Pratt & Whitney (PW) Service Bulletin No. PW4G-100-72-252, dated November 18, 2014.

(ii) Reserved.

(4) For PW service information identified in this AD, contact Pratt & Whitney, 400 Main St., East Hartford, CT 06108; phone: 860-565-8770; fax: 860-565-4503.

(5) You may view this service information at FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 781-238-7125.

(6) You may view this service information at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html>.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on October 9, 2015.
Robert G. Mann,
Acting Directorate Manager, Engine & Propeller Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.



2015-22-02 Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited: Amendment 39-18306; Docket No. FAA-2015-4345; Directorate Identifier 2015-SW-049-AD.

(a) Applicability

This AD applies to Model 429 helicopters with a pitch link assembly part number 429-012-112-101 or -103 installed, certificated in any category.

(b) Unsafe Condition

This AD defines the unsafe condition as a worn pitch link. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in pitch link failure and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

(c) Affected ADs

This AD supersedes Emergency AD 2015-16-51, Directorate Identifier 2015-SW-23-AD, dated August 6, 2015.

(d) Effective Date

This AD becomes effective November 12, 2015.

(e) Compliance

You are responsible for performing each action required by this AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

(f) Required Actions

(1) For helicopters with 50 or more hours time-in-service (TIS), before further flight, and for helicopters with less than 50 hours TIS, before accumulating 50 hours TIS, inspect each inboard and outboard tail rotor pitch link assembly for axial or radial bearing play. If there is axial or radial bearing play, remove the tail rotor pitch link and perform a dimensional inspection for wear. If there is wear that exceeds the allowable limits, replace the tail rotor pitch link assembly.

(2) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 50 hours TIS, repeat the inspections required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD.

(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Safety Management Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: David Hatfield, Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5110; email 9-ASW-FTW-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector,

the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office, before operating any aircraft complying with this AD through an AMOC.

(h) Additional Information

(1) Bell Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin 429-15-16, dated February 18, 2015, which is not incorporated by reference, contains additional information about the subject of this AD. For service information identified in this AD, contact Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited, 12,800 Rue de l'Avenir, Mirabel, Quebec J7J1R4; telephone (450) 437-2862 or (800) 363-8023; fax (450) 433-0272; or at <http://www.bellcustomer.com/files/>. You may review the referenced service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177.

(2) The subject of this AD is addressed in Transport Canada Emergency AD No. CF-2015-16R1, dated August 6, 2015. You may view the Transport Canada Emergency AD on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov> in Docket No. FAA-2015-4345.

(i) Subject

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 6720 Tail Rotor Control System.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 16, 2015.

Lance T. Gant,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.



2015-22-04 Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG: Amendment 38-18309; Docket No. FAA-2015-3300; Directorate Identifier 2015-CE-024-AD.

(a) Effective Date

This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective December 4, 2015.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

(c) Applicability

This AD applies to Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG Models G103 TWIN ASTIR, G103 TWIN II, and G103A TWIN II ACRO gliders, all manufacturer serial numbers, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 27: Flight Controls.

(e) Reason

This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as a broken bell-crank installed in the air brake control system. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct a broken bell-crank which could lead to failure of the air brake system, possibly resulting in reduced control.

(f) Actions and Compliance

Unless already done, do the following actions:

(1) Within 30 days after December 4, 2015 (the effective date of this AD) and repetitively thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 months, inspect the locking forces of the air brake control unit, and, if any discrepancy is found, before further flight, correct the locking forces. Do the inspection and correction of any discrepancy following the instructions of Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner Service Bulletin (SB-G08), Edition April 24, 2015; and Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner Anweisung (English translation: Instructions), (A/I-G08), Ausgabe (English translation: Edition) April 24, 2015.

Note 1 to paragraph (f)(1) of this AD: This service information contains German to English translation. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) used the English translation in referencing the document. For enforceability purposes, we will refer to the Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner service information as it appears on the document.

(2) Within 60 days after December 4, 2015 (the effective date of this AD), inspect the bell-crank installed in the air brake control system, and, if any cracks are found, before further flight, replace the bell-crank with a serviceable part. Do the inspection and replacement following the instructions of Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner Service Bulletin (SB-G08), Edition April 24, 2015; and Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner Anweisung (English translation: Instructions), (A/I-G08), Ausgabe (English translation: Edition) April 24, 2015.

Note 2 to paragraph (f)(2) of this AD: In the lower wing surface inspection, openings near the bell-crank may be installed to simplify the inspection and make a possible replacement of the bell-crank possible. This optional installation is described in GROB Luft Und Raumfahrt Service Bulletin 315-45/2, dated December 21, 1995; and Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner Service Bulletin (SB-G07), Edition April 24, 2015.

(3) Within 30 days after replacing a bell-crank as required by paragraph (f)(2) of this AD or within the next 30 days after December 4, 2015 (the effective date of this AD), whichever occurs later, report the inspection results of the removed bell-crank to Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG. You may find contact information for Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG in paragraph (h) of this AD.

(g) Other FAA AD Provisions

The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, Standards Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Jim Rutherford, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329-4165; fax: (816) 329-4090; email: jim.rutherford@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC on any glider to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, a federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2120-0056. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated to be approximately 5 minutes per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, completing and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Comments concerning the accuracy of this burden and suggestions for reducing the burden should be directed to the FAA at: 800 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591, Attn: Information Collection Clearance Officer, AES-200.

(h) Related Information

Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD No.: 2015-0116, dated June 24, 2015; GROB Luft Und Raumfahrt Service Bulletin 315-45/2, dated December 21, 1995; and Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner Service Bulletin (SB-G07), Edition April 24, 2015, for related information. You may examine the MCAI on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2015-3300-0003>.

(i) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(i) Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner Service Bulletin (SB-G08), Edition April 24, 2015; and

(ii) Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner Anweisung (English translation: Instructions), (A/I-G08), Ausgabe (English translation: Edition) April 24, 2015.

(3) For Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG service information identified in this AD, contact Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG, Steige 3, D-88487 Walpertshofen, Germany; phone: ++49 (0) 7353/22 43; fax: ++49 (0) 7353/30 96; email: Lindner.com">info@LTB-Lindner.com; Internet: <http://www.ltb-lindner.com>.

(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (816) 329-4148. In addition, you can access this service information on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2015-3300.

(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html>.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on October 22, 2015.

Melvin Johnson,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.



FAA
Aviation Safety

EMERGENCY

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/

DATE: October 23, 2015
AD #: 2015-22-51

This Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2015-22-51 is being sent to owners and operators of Agusta S.p.A. Model A109A and A109A II helicopters.

Background

This Emergency AD was prompted by abnormal vibrations leading to a precautionary landing and a post-flight inspection finding of a crack in a main rotor blade (blade). The crack extended from the trailing edge to the rear face of the spar at the joint between the spar and the body of the blade. The manufacturer's maintenance program specifies inspecting each blade every 25 hours time-in-service (TIS). This Emergency AD requires checking and inspecting each blade for a crack. The checks are required before each flight and the inspections are required before further flight and then once each day. Replacing any cracked blade is required before further flight. The actions in this Emergency AD are intended to detect a crack in a blade and prevent failure of a blade and subsequent loss of control of a helicopter.

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD No. 2015-0190-E, dated September 18, 2015, to correct an unsafe condition for the Agusta Model A109A and A109A II helicopters. EASA advises that abnormal vibrations were reported during a flight on a Model A109A II helicopter. During a post-flight inspection, a crack was found on a part number (P/N) 109-0103-01-9 blade. EASA AD 2015-0190-E requires pre-flight inspections and repetitive inspections of each blade. EASA advises that due to similarity of design, the inspections also apply to P/N 109-0103-01-7 and P/N 109-0103-01-115 blades. EASA advises that a cracked blade, if not detected and corrected, could affect the structural integrity of the blade, possibly resulting in blade failure and loss of control of the helicopter.

FAA's Determination

These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of Italy and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with Italy, EASA, its technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA Emergency AD. We are issuing this Emergency AD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of these same type designs.

Related Service Information

AgustaWestland has issued Mandatory Alert Bollettino Tecnico No. 109-150, dated September 17, 2015 (ABT), which specifies for blades with more than 500 flight hours, before the next flight and then before each flight, visually inspecting each affected blade for a crack in the area between the station at the end of the doublers and the station at the beginning of the abrasion strip (both top and bottom surfaces) for a crack. The ABT also specifies inspecting the blades for a crack

at every airworthiness check and, in case of doubt about a crack, dye penetrant inspecting each blade. If a crack is found, the ABT specifies replacing the blade with a serviceable one.

Emergency AD Requirements

This Emergency AD requires for each blade P/N 109-0103-01-7, P/N 109-0103-01-9, or P/N 109-0103-01-115 that has 500 or more hours TIS:

- Before further flight and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 24 clock-hours, using a 3X or higher power magnifying glass, visually inspecting the top and bottom surface of each blade for a crack in the area between the station at the end of the doublers and the station at the beginning of the abrasion strip. If there is a crack, before further flight, replacing the blade with an airworthy blade.
- Before each flight, checking the top and bottom surface of each blade for a crack in the area between the station at the end of the doublers and the station at the beginning of the abrasion strip. This check may be performed by the owner/operator (pilot) holding at least a private pilot certificate and must be entered into the aircraft records showing compliance with this Emergency AD in accordance with 14 CFR §§ 43.9 (a)(1) through (a)(4) and 14 CFR 91.417(a)(2)(v). The record must be maintained as required by 14 CFR §§ 91.417, 121.380, or 135.439. This check is an exception to our standard maintenance regulations. If there is a crack, the blade must be inspected using a 3X or higher power magnifying glass.

Differences Between This Emergency AD and the EASA AD

This Emergency AD does not require a change to the Rotorcraft Flight Manual nor does it require a dye-penetrant inspection, whereas the EASA AD does. This Emergency AD requires the blade inspection before further flight, whereas the EASA AD allows an initial check prior to the inspection.

Interim Action

We consider this Emergency AD to be an interim action. If final action is later identified, we might consider further rulemaking then.

Authority for this Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Adoption of the Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD)

We are issuing this Emergency AD under 49 U.S.C. Sections 106(g), 40113, and 44701 according to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator.

2015-22-51 Agusta S.p.A.: Directorate Identifier 2015-SW-070-AD.

(a) Applicability

This Emergency AD applies to Model A109A and A109AII helicopters with a main rotor blade (blade) part number (P/N) 109-0103-01-7, P/N 109-0103-01-9, or P/N 109-0103-01-115 that has 500 or more hours time-in-service installed, certificated in any category.

(b) Unsafe Condition

This Emergency AD defines the unsafe condition as a crack in a blade. This condition, if not detected, could result in failure of a blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

(c) Effective Date

This Emergency AD is effective upon receipt.

(d) Compliance

You are responsible for performing each action required by this Emergency AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

(e) Required Actions

(1) Before further flight, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 24 clock-hours, using a 3X or higher power magnifying glass, visually inspect the top and bottom surface of each blade for a crack in the area between the station at the end of the doublers and the station at the beginning of the abrasion strip. If there is a crack, before further flight, replace the blade with an airworthy blade.

(2) Before each flight, check the top and bottom surface of each blade for a crack in the area between the station at the end of the doublers and the station at the beginning of the abrasion strip. If there is a crack, inspect the blade in accordance with paragraph (e)(1) of this AD. The check required by this paragraph may be performed by the owner/operator (pilot) holding at least a private pilot certificate and must be entered into the aircraft records showing compliance with this AD in accordance with 14 CFR §§ 43.9 (a)(1) through (a)(4) and 14 CFR 91.417(a)(2)(v). The record must be maintained as required by 14 CFR §§ 91.417, 121.380, or 135.439.

(f) Special Flight Permits

A special flight permit may be permitted for the inspection in paragraph (e)(1) of this AD provided there is no crack in a blade.

(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Safety Management Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this Emergency AD. Send your proposal to: Matt Fuller, Senior Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5110; email: 9-ASW-FTW-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office, before operating any aircraft complying with this Emergency AD through an AMOC.

(h) Additional Information

(1) For further information contact: Matt Fuller, Senior Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5110; email matthew.fuller@faa.gov.

(2) For a copy of the service information referenced in this AD, contact: AgustaWestland, Product Support Engineering, Via del Gregge, 100, 21015 Lonate Pozzolo (VA) Italy, ATTN: Maurizio D'Angelo; telephone 39-0331-664757; fax 39-0331-664680; or at <http://www.agustawestland.com/technical-bulletins>.

(3) The subject of this AD is addressed in European Aviation Safety Agency AD No. 2015-0190-E, dated September 18, 2015.

(i) Subject

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Tracking Code: 6210 Main Rotor Blade.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 23, 2015.

Lance T. Gant,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.



DATE: October 28, 2015
AD #: 2015-22-52

This Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2015-22-52 is being sent to owners and operators of Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopters.

Background

This Emergency AD was prompted by two accidents and one incident of Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopters with a dual hydraulic system installed. From preliminary investigations, loss of tail rotor (T/R) control during take-off was evident in each event. Each event experienced a counterclockwise rotational yaw immediately after takeoff. It was also noted that the anti-torque pedals felt jammed or locked in the neutral position by the pilots in the two non-fatal events. The conditions in the events are indicative of takeoffs without hydraulic T/R assistance control caused by a lack of pressure in the T/R hydraulic system. When taking off without T/R hydraulic assistance with the switch on the collective grip in the “OFF” (aft) position, the yaw load compensator remains discharged and degrades the T/R hydraulic system, which significantly increases the pilot T/R control load and prevents sufficient T/R thrust for takeoff. This Emergency AD prohibits performing the yaw load compensator check (collective switch) during preflight procedures and instead requires performing it during post-flight procedures. This emergency AD also requires the yaw servo hydraulic switch (collective switch) to be in the “ON” (forward) position before taking-off. The actions in this Emergency AD are intended to prevent takeoff without hydraulic pressure in the T/R hydraulic system, loss of T/R flight control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

Based on the accidents and incident, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, issued EASA AD No. 2015-0178, dated August 26, 2015, to correct an unsafe condition for Airbus Helicopters Model AS 350 B3 helicopters, equipped with a dual hydraulic system identified as modification OP 3082 or OP 3346. EASA advises of a perceived loss of T/R control that mimics jamming during take-off if the T/R hydraulic preflight checks are not performed in accordance with the checklist in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM). According to EASA, performing the T/R hydraulic preflight checks improperly may result in reduced function of the T/R hydraulic system, thereby significantly increasing the T/R control load for the pilot.

FAA’s Determination

This helicopter has been approved by the aviation authority of France and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with France, EASA, its technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA AD. We are issuing this emergency AD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of the same type design.

Related Service Information

Airbus Helicopters issued Service Bulletin No. AS350-67.00.66, Revision 1, dated October 22, 2015 (SB AS350-67.00.66), which specifies inserting specific pages of the bulletin into the RFM. These pages revise the preflight and post-flight hydraulic checks by moving the T/R yaw load compensator check from preflight to post-flight. These pages also revise terminology within the flight manuals for the different engine configurations.

Airbus Helicopters also issued Safety Information Notice No. 2944-S-29, Revision 0, dated August 26, 2015 (SIN 2944-S-29), which warns that attempting to take off without T/R hydraulic assistance (the yaw servo hydraulic switch on the collective grip in the “OFF” (aft) position) might be incorrectly perceived as T/R control failure (jam), which could lead to loss of control of the helicopter if not quickly identified and corrected. SIN 2944-S-29 also advises of the RFM update that revises the run-up hydraulic check starting procedures to no longer specify pressing the yaw servo hydraulic switch. Pressing the yaw servo hydraulic switch, which is part of the yaw load compensator check, discharges the yaw load compensator. The yaw load compensator check has been moved from preflight to post-flight procedures. Further, SIN 2944-S-29 states the yaw servo hydraulic switch, which is located on the collective grip, is also called the hydraulic pressure switch or hydraulic cut off switch in various RFMs.

Emergency AD Requirements

This Emergency AD requires, before further flight, no longer performing the yaw load compensator check (collective switch) during preflight procedures and instead performing the yaw load compensator check during post-flight procedures. This Emergency AD also requires the yaw servo hydraulic switch (collective switch) to be in the “ON” (forward) position before taking off. The yaw servo hydraulic switch may also be called the hydraulic pressure switch or hydraulic cut off switch.

Differences Between This Emergency AD and the EASA AD

The EASA AD requires revising the RFM by incorporating procedures contained in Airbus Helicopters Service Bulletin No. AS350-67.00.66, Revision 0, dated August 26, 2015, and informing all flight crew of the RFM changes. This Emergency AD prohibits performing the yaw load compensator check during preflight procedures and requires it to be performed during post-flight procedures. This Emergency AD also requires the yaw servo hydraulic switch (collective switch) to be in the “ON” (forward) position before taking off.

Interim Action

We consider this Emergency AD to be an interim action. The design approval holder is currently developing a terminating action that will address the unsafe condition identified in this Emergency AD. Once this terminating action is developed, approved, and available, we might consider additional rulemaking.

Authority for this Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Adoption of the Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD)

We are issuing this Emergency AD under 49 U.S.C. Sections 106(g), 40113, and 44701 according to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator.

2015-22-52 Airbus Helicopters: Directorate Identifier 2015-SW-074-AD.

(a) Applicability

This Emergency AD applies to Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopters with a dual hydraulic system installed, certificated in any category.

Note 1 to paragraph (a) of this Emergency AD: The dual hydraulic system for Model AS350B3 helicopters is referred to as Airbus modification OP 3082 or OP 3346.

(b) Unsafe Condition

This Emergency AD defines the unsafe condition as lack of hydraulic pressure in a tail rotor (T/R) hydraulic system. This condition could result in loss of T/R flight control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

(c) Effective Date

This Emergency AD is effective upon receipt.

(d) Compliance

You are responsible for performing each action required by this Emergency AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

(e) Required Actions

Before further flight, stop performing the yaw load compensator check (collective switch) during preflight procedures, and instead perform the yaw load compensator check during post-flight procedures. The yaw servo hydraulic switch (collective switch) must be in the “ON” (forward) position before takeoff.

Note 2 to paragraph (e) of this Emergency AD: The yaw servo hydraulic switch is also called the hydraulic pressure switch or hydraulic cut off switch in various Airbus Helicopters flight manuals.

(f) Special Flight Permit

A special flight permit is prohibited.

(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Safety Management Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this Emergency AD. Send your proposal to: Stephen Barbini, Flight Test Engineer, Regulations and Policy Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5110; email 9-ASW-FTW-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office, before operating any aircraft complying with this Emergency AD through an AMOC.

(h) Additional Information

(1) For further information contact: Stephen Barbini, Flight Test Engineer, Regulations and Policy Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5110; email stephen.barbini@faa.gov.

(2) Airbus Helicopters Service Bulletin No. AS350-67.00.66, Revision 1, dated October 22, 2015, and Airbus Helicopters Safety Information Notice No. 2944-S-29, Revision 0, dated August 26, 2015, provide additional information about this Emergency AD. For a copy of this service information referenced in this AD, contact: Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N. Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; telephone (972) 641-0000 or (800) 232-0323; fax (972) 641-3775; or at <http://www.airbushelicopters.com/techpub>.

(3) The subject of this AD is addressed in European Aviation Safety Agency AD No. 2015-0178, dated August 26, 2015.

(i) Subject

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 2910, Main Hydraulic System.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 28, 2015.

Lance T. Gant,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.



DATE: October 30, 2015
AD #: 2015-22-53

This superseding Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2015-22-53 is being sent to owners and operators of Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopters to correct an error in terminology and a defect in recording compliance in Emergency AD 2015-22-52.

Background

On October 28, 2015 we issued Emergency AD 2015-22-52 for Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopters with a dual hydraulic system that prohibited performing the yaw load compensator check (collective switch) during preflight procedures and instead required performing it during post-flight procedures. Emergency AD 2015-22-52 also required the yaw servo hydraulic switch (collective switch) to be in the “ON” (forward) position before taking-off. The actions in Emergency AD 2015-22-52 were intended to prevent takeoff without hydraulic pressure in the T/R hydraulic system, loss of T/R flight control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

Emergency AD 2015-22-52 was prompted by two accidents and one incident of Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopters with a dual hydraulic system installed. From preliminary investigations, loss of tail rotor (T/R) control during take-off was evident in each event. Each event experienced a counterclockwise rotational yaw immediately after takeoff. It was also noted that the anti-torque pedals felt jammed or locked in the neutral position by the pilots in the two non-fatal events. The conditions in the events are indicative of takeoffs without hydraulic T/R assistance caused by a lack of pressure in the T/R hydraulic system. When taking off without T/R hydraulic assistance with the switch on the collective grip in the “OFF” (aft) position, the yaw load compensator remains discharged and degrades the T/R hydraulic system, which significantly increases the pilot T/R control load and prevents sufficient T/R thrust for takeoff.

Based on the accidents and incident, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, issued EASA AD No. 2015-0178, dated August 26, 2015, to correct an unsafe condition for Airbus Helicopters Model AS 350 B3 helicopters, equipped with a dual hydraulic system identified as modification OP 3082 or OP 3346. EASA advises of a perceived loss of T/R control that mimics jamming during take-off if the T/R hydraulic preflight checks are not performed in accordance with the checklist in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM). According to EASA, performing the T/R hydraulic preflight checks improperly may result in reduced function of the T/R hydraulic system, thereby significantly increasing the T/R control load for the pilot.

Actions Since Emergency AD 2015-22-52 was Issued

After we issued Emergency AD 2015-22-52, we received comments noting an error in terminology and a defect in reporting compliance that resulted in confusion in how to comply with the Emergency AD. Therefore, we are superseding Emergency AD 2015-22-52 to clarify the requirements. Specifically, we referred to the collective switch for the yaw load compensator check, when we should have referred to the ACCU TST switch. We also omitted a method of recording compliance.

FAA's Determination

This helicopter has been approved by the aviation authority of France and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with France, EASA, its technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA AD. We are issuing this Emergency AD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of the same type design.

Related Service Information

Airbus Helicopters issued Service Bulletin No. AS350-67.00.66, Revision 1, dated October 22, 2015 (SB AS350-67.00.66), which specifies inserting specific pages of the bulletin into the RFM. These pages revise the preflight and post-flight hydraulic checks by moving the T/R yaw load compensator check from preflight to post-flight. These pages also revise terminology within the flight manuals for the different engine configurations.

Airbus Helicopters also issued Safety Information Notice No. 2944-S-29, Revision 0, dated August 26, 2015 (SIN 2944-S-29), which warns that attempting to take off without T/R hydraulic assistance (which may be caused by the yaw servo hydraulic switch on the collective grip in the "OFF" (aft) position) might be incorrectly perceived as T/R control failure (jam), which could lead to loss of control of the helicopter if not quickly identified and corrected. SIN 2944-S-29 also advises of the RFM update that revises the run-up hydraulic check starting procedures to no longer specify "pressing" the yaw servo hydraulic switch. To mitigate this potential error, the yaw load compensator check has been moved from preflight to post-flight procedures. Further, SIN 2944-S-29 states the yaw servo hydraulic switch, which is located on the collective grip, is also called the hydraulic pressure switch or hydraulic cut off switch in various RFMs.

Emergency AD Requirements

This Emergency AD requires, before further flight, revising the rotorcraft flight manual to stop performing the yaw load compensator check (ACCU TST switch) during preflight procedures and instead performing the yaw load compensator check during post-flight procedures after rotor shut-down. This Emergency AD also requires the yaw servo hydraulic switch (collective switch) to be in the "ON" (forward) position before taking off. The yaw servo hydraulic switch may also be called the hydraulic pressure switch or hydraulic cut off switch.

Differences Between This Emergency AD and the EASA AD

The EASA AD requires revising the RFM by incorporating procedures contained in Airbus Helicopters Service Bulletin No. AS350-67.00.66, Revision 0, dated August 26, 2015, and informing all flight crew of the RFM changes. This Emergency AD requires revising the RFM by inserting a copy of this Emergency AD or by making pen and ink changes.

Interim Action

We consider this Emergency AD to be an interim action. The design approval holder is currently developing a terminating action that will address the unsafe condition identified in this Emergency AD. Once this terminating action is developed, approved, and available, we might consider additional rulemaking.

Authority for this Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Adoption of the Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD)

We are issuing this Emergency AD under 49 U.S.C. Sections 106(g), 40113, and 44701 according to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator.

2015-22-53 Airbus Helicopters: Directorate Identifier 2015-SW-083-AD. Supersedes Emergency AD 2015-22-52.

(a) Applicability

This Emergency AD applies to Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopters with a dual hydraulic system installed, certificated in any category.

Note 1 to paragraph (a) of this Emergency AD: The dual hydraulic system for Model AS350B3 helicopters is referred to as Airbus modification OP 3082 or OP 3346.

(b) Unsafe Condition

This Emergency AD defines the unsafe condition as lack of hydraulic pressure in a tail rotor (T/R) hydraulic system. This condition could result in loss of T/R flight control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

(c) Effective Date

This Emergency AD is effective upon receipt.

(d) Affected ADs

This Emergency AD supersedes Emergency AD 2015-22-52 issued on October 28, 2015.

(e) Compliance

You are responsible for performing each action required by this Emergency AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

(f) Required Actions

Before further flight, insert a copy of this Emergency AD into the rotorcraft flight manual, Section 4 Normal Operating Procedures, or make pen and ink changes to the preflight and post-flight procedures as follows:

(1) Stop performing the yaw load compensator check (ACCU TST switch) during preflight procedures, and instead perform the yaw load compensator check during post-flight procedures after rotor shut-down.

(2) The yaw servo hydraulic switch (collective switch) must be in the “ON” (forward) position before takeoff.

Note 2 to paragraph (f)(2) of this Emergency AD: The yaw servo hydraulic switch is also called the hydraulic pressure switch or hydraulic cut off switch in various Airbus Helicopters rotorcraft flight manuals.

(g) Special Flight Permits

Special flight permits are prohibited.

(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Safety Management Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this Emergency AD. Send your proposal to: Stephen Barbini, Flight Test Engineer, Regulations and Policy Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5110; email 9-ASW-FTW-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office, before operating any aircraft complying with this Emergency AD through an AMOC.

(i) Additional Information

(1) For further information contact: Stephen Barbini, Flight Test Engineer, Regulations and Policy Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5110; email stephen.barbini@faa.gov.

(2) Airbus Helicopters Service Bulletin No. AS350-67.00.66, Revision 1, dated October 22, 2015, and Airbus Helicopters Safety Information Notice No. 2944-S-29, Revision 0, dated August 26, 2015, provide additional information about this Emergency AD. For a copy of the service information referenced in this Emergency AD, contact: Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N. Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; telephone (972) 641-0000 or (800) 232-0323; fax (972) 641-3775; or at <http://www.airbushelicopters.com/techpub>.

(3) The subject of this AD is addressed in European Aviation Safety Agency AD No. 2015-0178, dated August 26, 2015.

(j) Subject

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 2910, Main Hydraulic System.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 30, 2015.

Lance T. Gant,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.