

**FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION  
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**

**SMALL AIRPLANES, ROTORCRAFT, GLIDERS,  
BALLOONS, & AIRSHIPS**

**BIWEEKLY 2015-19**

*9/7/2015 - 9/20/2015*



Federal Aviation Administration  
Continued Operational Safety Policy Section, AIR-141  
P.O. Box 25082  
Oklahoma City, OK 73125-0460

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**SMALL AIRCRAFT, ROTORCRAFT, GLIDERS, BALLOONS, & AIRSHIPS**

AD No.	Information	Manufacturer	Applicability
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Information Key: E - Emergency; COR - Correction; S – Supersedes; R - Replaces

**Biweekly 2015-01**

2014-26-04		GROB-WERKE	G115EG and G120A
2014-26-05		Beechcraft Corporation	G58

**Biweekly 2015-02**

2014-26-02		Airbus Helicopters	EC155B1 and AS 365 N3 helicopters
2015-01-02		Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.	MU-2B-30, MU-2B-35, MU-2B-36, MU-2B-36A and MU-2B-60

**Biweekly 2015-03**

2014-12-11 R1	R 2014-12-11	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation	S-92A
2015-01-03		Pilatus Aircraft Ltd	PC-7
2015-02-01	S 2011-23-01	Technify Motors GmbH (TMG)	TAE 125-01 and TAE 125-02-99
2015-02-07		Lycoming Engines	AEIO-320-D1B; AEIO-360-A1E, -A1E6, -B1H, -H1B; AEIO-540-D4A5, -D4B5, -D4D5, -L1B5, -L1B5D, -L1D5; AEIO-580-B1A; and IO-540-K1K5
2015-02-09		Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecnam srl	P2006T
2015-02-10		Viking Air Limited	DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-2 Mk. III
2015-02-15		Quest Aircraft Design, LLC	KODIAK 100
2015-02-22	S 2012-14-06	Rolls-Royce Corporation	250-B17, -B17B, -B17C, -B17D, -B17E, -B17F, -B17F/1, -B17F/2; and 250-C20, -C20B, -C20F, -C20J, -C20R, -C20R/1, -C20R/2, -C20R/4, -C20S, and -C20W
2015-02-27	S 2013-19-19	Airbus Helicopters	AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, AS332L2, and EC225LP

**Biweekly 2015-04**

2014-22-51		Airbus Helicopters	EC130T2 helicopters
2015-02-21		Agusta S.p.A.	AB139 and AW139 helicopters
2015-04-51	E	Enstrom Helicopter Corporation	F-28A, 280, F-28C, F-28C-2, F-28C-2R, 280C, F-28F, F-28F-R, 280F, 280FX, and 480 helicopters

**Biweekly 2015-05**

2015-04-01		Short Brothers & Harland Ltd	SC-7 Series 3
2015-04-04		Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.	412 and 412EP
2015-04-05		Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation	S-76A, S-76B, S-76C, and S-76D
2015-05-51	E	Agusta S.p.A.	A109A and A109A II
2015-05-52	E	Agusta S.p.A.	A109, A109A, A109A II, A109C, A109K2, A109E, A119, A109S, AW119 MKII, and AW109SP

**Biweekly 2015-06**

2015-04-01	COR	Short Brothers & Harland Ltd	SC-7 Series 3 airplanes
2015-05-04		Bell Helicopter Textron Canada	407 helicopters
2015-05-05	S 2014-04-14	Agusta	A109S and AW109SP helicopters; A119 and AW119 MKII helicopters
2015-05-06		Flugzeugwerke Altenrhein AG	AS 202/15 "BRAVO", AS 202/18A "BRAVO", and AS 202/18A4 "BRAVO" airplanes
2015-06-01	S 2014-06-03	British Aerospace	Jetstream Series 3101 and Jetstream 3201 airplanes
2015-06-02		GA 8 Airvan	GA8-TC320 airplanes
2015-06-03		Stemme AG	S6 and S6-RT gliders

**Biweekly 2015-07**

2015-06-09		Pacific Aerospace Limited	750XL airplanes
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**Biweekly 2015-08**

2015-05-52		Agusta S.p.A.	A109, A109A, A109A II, A109C, A109K2, A109E, A119, A109S, AW119 MKII, and AW109SP
2015-07-03		Cessna Aircraft Company	402C and 414A
2015-07-04		Pilatus Aircraft Ltd.	PC-7
2015-08-51	E S 2015-04-51	The Enstrom Helicopter Corporation	F-28A, 280, F-28C, F-28C-2, F-28C-2R, 280C, F-28F, F-28F-R, 280F, and 280FX; and 480

**SMALL AIRCRAFT, ROTORCRAFT, GLIDERS, BALLOONS, & AIRSHIPS**

AD No.	Information	Manufacturer	Applicability
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**Biweekly 2015-09**

2014-17-08R1	R 2014-17-08	Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (P&WC)	PT6A-114 and PT6A-114A
2015-08-04	S 99-01-05 R1	Various Airplanes	See AD

**Biweekly 2015-10**

2015-08-07		Zodiac Aerotechnics	See Ad
2015-09-01		Airbus Helicopters	EC225LP
2015-09-04	S 2013-22-14 R1	DG Flugzeugbau GmbH	DG-1000T
2015-09-06	S 2014-26-04	GROB-WERKE	G115EG and G120A

**Biweekly 2015-11**

2015-08-51	S 2015-04-51	The Enstrom Helicopter Corporation	F-28A, 280, F-28C, F-28C-2, F-28C-2R, 280C, F-28F, F-28F-R, 280F, 280FX; 480
2015-10-05		Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter France)	AS365N3, EC155B, and EC155B1
2015-10-06		Lycoming Engines	TIO-540-AJ1A
2015-10-07	S 2014-01-01	Turbomeca S.A.	Arrius 2F
2015-10-51	E	Avidyne Aerospace	Integrated Flight Displays
2015-11-01		Slingsby Aviation Ltd.	T67M260 and T67M260-T3A

**Biweekly 2015-12**

2015-11-06	S 2013-18-01	Airbus Helicopters	EC 155B, EC155B1, SA-365N, SA-365N1, AS-365N2, AS 365 N3, and SA-366G1
2015-11-07		Agusta S.p.A.	AB412 and AB412 EP
2015-11-08	S 2014-02-08	Agusta	A109C, A109S, A109K2, A109E, and AW109SP
2015-11-09		Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation	269D and 269D
2015-11-10		Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation	S-92A
2015-12-01		Airbus Helicopters	AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, and AS355F2
2015-12-02		Bell	206L-1, 206L-3, and 206L-4

**Biweekly 2015-13**

2015-05-51		Agusta S.p.A.	A109A, A109A II
2015-10-51		Avidyne Corporation	Integrated Flight Displays (IFDs)
2015-12-04	COR R 2006-15-08	Honeywell International Inc.	TPE331-1, -2, -2UA, -3U, -3UW, -5, -5A, -5AB, -5B, -6, -6A, -10, -10AV, -10GP, -10GT, -10P, -10R, -10T, -10U, -10UA, -10UF, -10UG, -10UGR, -10UR, -11U, -12JR, -12UA, -12UAR, and -12UHR
2015-12-09		Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH	EC135P1, EC135T1, EC135P2, EC135T2, EC135P2+, EC135T2+, and MBB-BK 117 C-2

**Biweekly 2015-14**

2015-13-03		Przedsiębiorstwo Doswiadczalno-Produkcyjne Szybownictwa "PZL-Bielsko"	SZD-50-3 "Puchacz"
2015-13-09		Piper Aircraft, Inc.	PA-46-350P and PA-46-500TP
2015-13-10	S 2011-17-07	M7 Aerospace LLC	SA226-T, SA226-T(B), SA226-TC, and SA226-AT
2015-13-11		Bell Helicopter Textron Canada	430

**Biweekly 2015-15**

2015-06-02 R1	R 2015-06-02	GA 8 Airvan (Pty) Ltd	TC320
2015-12-04	COR R2006-15-08	Honeywell International Inc.	TPE331-1, -2, -2UA, -3U, -3UW, -5, -5A, -5AB, -5B, -6, -6A, -10, -10AV, -10GP, -10GT, -10P, -10R, -10T, -10U, -10UA, -10UF, -10UG, -10UGR, -10UR, -11U, -12JR, -12UA, -12UAR, and -12UHR
2015-14-02		GE Aviation Czech s.r.o.	M601E-11, M601E-11A, and M601F
2015-14-04		Kaman Aerospace Corporation	K-1200
2015-14-10		Pilatus Aircraft LTD	PC-12/47 and PC-12/47E
2015-15-04		Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.	204B, 205A, and 205A-1; and 212

**Biweekly 2015-16**

2015-12-04	COR R 2006-15-08	Honeywell International Inc.	TPE331-1, -2, -2UA, -3U, -3UW, -5, -5A, -5AB, -5B, -6, -6A, -10, -10AV, -10GP, -10GT, -10P, -10R, -10T, -10U, -10UA, -10UF, -10UG, -10UGR, -10UR, -11U, -12JR, -12UA, -12UAR, and -12UHR
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**SMALL AIRCRAFT, ROTORCRAFT, GLIDERS, BALLOONS, & AIRSHIPS**

AD No.	Information	Manufacturer	Applicability
Information Key: E - Emergency; COR - Correction; S – Supersedes; R - Replaces			
2015-13-04	S 2014-19-05	Turbomeca S.A.	Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, 1S1, 2B, 2B1, 2C, 2C1, 2C2, 2S1, and 2S2
2015-16-51	E	Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (Bell)	429
<b>Biweekly 2015-17</b>			
2015-16-04		Kidde Gravier	See AD
2015-16-05		British Aerospace Regional Aircraft	Jetstream Series 3101 and Jetsream Model 3201
2015-16-06		British Aerospace Regional Aircraft	Jetstream Model 3201
2015-16-07		Reims Aviation S.A.	F406
2015-17-01	S 2013-21-01	Airbus Helicopters	AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350C, AS350D, AS350D1, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP
2015-17-02	S 2001-13-51	Bell Helicopter Textron Canada	206L-4, 407, 427, and 429
<b>Biweekly 2015-18</b>			
2015-17-10	S 2007-04-13	SOCATA	TBM 700
2015-17-11		Airbus Helicopters	AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350C, AS350D, AS350D1, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, AS355NP, EC130B4, and EC130T2
2015-17-18		Turbomeca S.A.	Arrius 2F
2015-17-20		GE Aviation Czech s.r.o	M601E-11, M601E-11A, and M601F
2015-18-01		Vulcanair S.p.A.	P.68R
<b>Biweekly 2015-19</b>			
2015-18-51	E	Airbus Helicopters	AS332C, AS332C1, AS332L, and AS332L1
2015-19-51	E	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation	S-76A, S-76B, S-76C, and S-76D



**FAA**  
**Aviation Safety**

# **EMERGENCY**

## **AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE**

[www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/](http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/)

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**DATE: September 11, 2015**  
**AD #: 2015-18-51**

This emergency airworthiness directive (EAD) 2015-18-51 is being sent to owners and operators of Airbus Helicopters Model AS332C, AS332C1, AS332L, and AS332L1 helicopters.

### **Background**

This EAD was prompted by a report of a tail rotor (T/R) de-icing system power supply box stuck in a “closed” position providing an uncontrolled and un-announced power supply to the system. The T/R de-icing system is part of the entire rotor de-icing system. This EAD requires inspecting certain T/R blades, replacing the set of T/R blades if there is damage, deactivating the rotor de-icing system, revising the rotorcraft flight manual (RFM), and installing a placard. These EAD actions are intended to detect and prevent structural damage to the T/R blades caused by overheating, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, issued EASA EAD No. 2015-0153-E, dated July 24, 2015, to correct an unsafe condition for Airbus Helicopters Model AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 L, and AS 332 L1 helicopters, equipped with T/R de-icing installation unit part number (P/N) 204ZP01Y01 and T/R blade P/N 332A12-0055-XX (where XX represents any dash number). EASA advises of a report of a T/R blade that was overheated and damaged after application of alternating current (AC) from a ground power unit (GPU) following a flight during which the de-icing system was used. Subsequent analysis determined failure of the power supply box stuck in the “closed” position caused the uncontrolled power supply to the rotor blade de-icing system and subsequent damage. EASA also states that its EAD is considered an interim action and further AD action may follow.

### **FAA’s Determination**

These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of France and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with France, EASA, its technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA EAD. We are issuing this EAD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of these same type designs.

### **Related Service Information**

Airbus Helicopters issued Alert Service Bulletin No. AS332-05.01.02, Revision 0, dated July 22, 2015 (ASB), which specifies, before each flight and before starting at least one engine, if the applicable helicopter has been supplied external 115V/400Hz AC GPU with the rotor stationary or if the de-icing system has been used or tested using an AC GPU with the rotor stationary or spinning, visually inspecting the T/R blades for burn marks, detached leading edge protection, or cracks at the skin/leading edge protection junction. If at least one T/R blade is damaged, the ASB specifies replacing all of the T/R blades.

## **EAD Requirements**

This EAD requires, before further flight, inspecting each T/R blade for a burn mark, any disbonding of the leading edge protection, and a crack at the junction of the skin and the leading edge protection. If there is a burn mark, any disbonding of the leading edge protection, or a crack at the junction of the skin and the leading edge protection on a T/R blade, this EAD requires replacing all of the T/R blades with airworthy T/R blades. This EAD also requires deactivating the rotor de-icing system, revising the RFM to state that flight into known icing is prohibited, and installing a placard stating that the rotor de-icing system is deactivated.

## **Differences Between This EAD and the EASA EAD**

The EASA EAD allows operation of the rotor de-icing system with a recurring inspection of the T/R blades. This EAD requires an initial inspection and prohibits operation of the rotor de-icing system by deactivating the rotor de-icing system, revising the RFM to state flight into known icing is prohibited, and installing a placard stating that the rotor de-icing system is deactivated.

## **Interim Action**

We consider this EAD to be an interim action. Once a modification to the rotor de-icing system design is evaluated, approved, and available, we might consider additional rulemaking.

## **Authority for this Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

## **Adoption of the Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD)**

We are issuing this EAD under 49 U.S.C. Sections 106(g), 40113, and 44701 according to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator.

**2015-18-51 Airbus Helicopters:** Directorate Identifier 2015-SW-039-AD.

### **(a) Applicability**

This EAD applies to Airbus Helicopters Model AS332C, AS332C1, AS332L, and AS332L1 with tail rotor (T/R) de-icing installation unit part number (P/N) 204ZP01Y01 and T/R blade P/N 332A12-0055-XX (where XX is any dash number) installed, certificated in any category.

### **(b) Unsafe Condition**

This EAD defines the unsafe condition as uncontrolled and un-annunciated power supply to the T/R de-icing system, which could overheat the T/R blades. This condition could result in structural damage to the T/R blades and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

**(c) Effective Date**

This EAD is effective upon receipt.

**(d) Compliance**

You are responsible for performing each action required by this EAD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

**(e) Required Actions**

Before further flight:

(1) Inspect each T/R blade for a burn mark, any disbonding of the leading edge protection, and a crack at the junction of the skin and the leading edge protection. Examples of a burn mark, disbonding, and a crack are shown in the photos under paragraph 3.B.2., Accomplishment Instructions, of Airbus Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin No. AS332-05.01.02, Revision 0, dated July 22, 2015. If there is a burn mark, any disbonding of the leading edge protection, or a crack at the junction of the skin and the leading edge protection on a T/R blade, replace all of the T/R blades with airworthy T/R blades.

(2) Deactivate the rotor de-icing system.

(3) Revise Section 2, Limitations, of the Protective Equipment for Flight in Icing Conditions supplement to the rotorcraft flight manual by inserting the following: ROTOR DE-ICING SYSTEM IS DEACTIVATED. FLIGHT INTO KNOWN ICING IS PROHIBITED.

(4) Install a placard with 6 millimeter red letters on a white background next to the rotors de-icing control panel that states the following: ROTOR DE-ICING SYSTEM IS DEACTIVATED.

**(f) Special Flight Permit**

Special flight permits will be permitted for flights to a location where the required inspection can be performed provided the flight does not exceed 5 hours time-in-service.

**(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)**

(1) The Manager, Safety Management Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this EAD. Send your proposal to: George Schwab, Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5110; email 9-ASW-FTW-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office, before operating any aircraft complying with this EAD through an AMOC.

**(h) Additional Information**

(1) For further information contact: George Schwab, Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5110; email george.schwab@faa.gov.

(2) For a copy of the service information referenced in this AD, contact: Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N. Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; telephone (972) 641-0000 or (800) 232-0323; fax (972) 641-3775; or at <http://www.airbushelicopters.com/techpub>.

(3) The subject of this AD is addressed in European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) EAD No. 2015-0153-E, dated July 24, 2015.

**(i) Subject**

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 3060, Rotor De-Ice System.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on September 11, 2015.

Jim Grigg,  
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,  
Aircraft Certification Service.



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**DATE: September 14, 2015**  
**AD #: 2015-19-51**

This emergency airworthiness directive (EAD) 2015-19-51 is being sent to owners and operators of Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-76A, S-76B, S-76C, and S-76D helicopters.

## **Background**

This EAD was prompted by an accident of a Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-76C helicopter. During preliminary investigation, a failed servo input control pushrod (pushrod) assembly was identified. Separation of the pushrod tube and the control rod end with bearing was found. This EAD requires inspecting the main rotor (M/R) forward, aft, and lateral pushrod assemblies, the tail rotor (T/R) pushrod assembly, and the jamnuts, and applying slippage marks across the pushrod tubes and jamnuts. These EAD actions are intended to prevent loss of M/R or T/R flight control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

## **FAA's Determination**

We are issuing this EAD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of these same type designs.

## **Related Service Information**

Sikorsky issued Alert Service Bulletin No. 76-67-57, Basic Issue, dated September 10, 2015 (ASB), which specifies a one-time inspection of the M/R forward, aft, and lateral pushrod assemblies, the T/R pushrod assembly, and the jamnuts for proper installation, condition, and security. If a pushrod or jamnut does not meet criteria specified in the inspection, the ASB specifies replacing the assembly. The ASB also specifies applying two slippage marks across each M/R and T/R pushrod tube and jamnut. Further, the ASB references the applicable maintenance manual for a new recurring inspection of the slippage marks.

## **EAD Requirements**

This EAD requires, within five hours time-in-service, inspecting each M/R and T/R pushrod assembly by inspecting the position of the control rod end in the pushrod tube. If the lockwire passes through the inspection hole, this EAD requires replacing the pushrod assembly. If the lockwire does not pass through the inspection hole, this EAD requires inspecting the jamnut to determine seating position against the pushrod and whether the jamnut can be turned with finger pressure. If the jamnut is not seated against the pushrod or is loose, this EAD requires replacing the pushrod assembly. This EAD also requires, both for those pushrod assemblies that are replaced and for those that pass the inspections, applying two slippage marks across each M/R and T/R pushrod tube and jamnut.

## **Interim Action**

We consider this EAD interim action as the accident investigation is ongoing. If additional action is later identified, we might consider further rulemaking.

## **Authority for this Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

## **Adoption of the Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD)**

We are issuing this EAD under 49 U.S.C. Sections 106(g), 40113, and 44701 according to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator.

2015-19-51 **Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation**: Directorate Identifier 2015-SW-065-AD.

### **(a) Applicability**

This EAD applies to Model S-76A, S-76B, S-76C, and S-76D helicopters with main rotor (M/R) servo input control pushrod (pushrod) assembly part number (P/N) 76400-00034-059 or tail rotor (T/R) pushrod assembly P/N 76400-00014-071 installed, certificated in any category.

### **(b) Unsafe Condition**

This EAD defines the unsafe condition as a loose jamnut. This condition could result in failure of a pushrod assembly, loss of M/R or T/R flight control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

### **(c) Effective Date**

This EAD is effective upon receipt.

### **(d) Compliance**

You are responsible for performing each action required by this EAD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

### **(e) Required Actions**

Within five hours time-in-service:

(1) Inspect each pushrod end to determine whether a 0.020 inch diameter lockwire can pass through the inspection hole.

(i) If the lockwire passes through the inspection hole, replace the pushrod assembly.

(ii) If the lockwire does not pass through the inspection hole, inspect the jamnut to determine whether it is seated against the pushrod and whether it can be turned with finger pressure. If the jamnut is not seated against the pushrod or can be turned with finger pressure, replace the pushrod assembly.

(2) Apply two slippage marks across each pushrod tube and jamnut as follows:

(i) Clean the area where a slippage mark is to be applied.

(ii) Apply two slippage marks across the pushrod tube and jamnut, parallel and on opposite sides of each other. Each slippage mark must extend at least 0.5 inch onto the pushrod tube and must not cover the inspection hole. Figures 2 and 4 of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 76-67-57, Basic Issue, dated September 10, 2015, illustrate slippage marks across a pushrod tube and jamnut.

**(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)**

(1) The Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this EAD. Send your proposal to: Blaine Williams, Aerospace Engineer, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781) 238-7161; email [blaine.williams@faa.gov](mailto:blaine.williams@faa.gov).

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office, before operating any aircraft complying with this EAD through an AMOC.

**(g) Additional Information**

(1) For further information contact: Blaine Williams, Aerospace Engineer, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781) 238-7161; email [blaine.williams@faa.gov](mailto:blaine.williams@faa.gov).

(2) For a copy of the service information referenced in this AD, contact: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Customer Service Engineering, 124 Quarry Road, Trumbull, CT 06611; telephone 1-800-Winged-S or 203-416-4299; email [sikorskywcs@sikorsky.com](mailto:sikorskywcs@sikorsky.com).

**(h) Subject**

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 2700, Flight Control System.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on September 14, 2015.

James A. Grigg,  
Acting Directorate Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,  
Aircraft Certification Service.